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Upstream ﬁrms in vertically-separated markets use a variety of contractual arrangements to
inﬂuence the behavior of downstream ﬁrms (e.g., resale price maintenance, exclusive dealing,
exclusive territories, revenue-sharing contracts, and bundling). Such vertical arrangements
and bundling options are especially important in markets for information goods (e.g., mu-
sic, television, movies, and books), particularly as digitalization of these markets increases
and new distribution channels emerge. An extensive theoretical literature has examined
ﬁrms’ incentives to adopt various types of vertical and product-bundling contracts, as well
as their competitive eﬀects and welfare impacts more generally. In the case of vertical ar-
rangements, some theoretical explanations focus on anti-competitive rationales for ﬁrms to
bundle, whereas others focus on eﬃciency-inducing rationales. Thus, empirical evidence is
essential for understanding the impact of diﬀerent vertical bundling arrangements in place
across diﬀerent markets, both for information goods, and for markets more generally.
Limited product-level data are a key challenge to empirical analyses of the impact of
vertical arrangements and bundling. This is especially true for information-goods markets,
which are characterized by a continual introduction of new products over time, with demand
that peaks early and decays rapidly. In many cases, consumer demand for content in these
markets is unobserved or poorly measured. In this paper we rely on an extensive dataset
on the video-rental industry that provides detailed information on both consumer demand
for products, and vertical contractual and bundling arrangements between upstream and
downstream ﬁrms. The data contain substantial information on the introduction of new
content (i.e., movies) and the subsequent demand proﬁles for this new content over time at
the individual store level. The data are used to analyze the demand eﬀects of a change in
the variety of new movies stocked at a store that are induced by a revenue-sharing form of
bundling, along with the general welfare implications of the vertical bundling contract. The
video-rental industry is an early example of bundling in an information-goods market. While
the technology for distributing information goods has changed, we believe that our empirical
approach provides a useful guide for how to analyze the welfare eﬀects of vertical bundling
contracts for more current markets (e.g., content bundling in cable television, iTunes, or
movie downloading services).
The bundling arrangement in the video-rental industry takes the form of a “full-line
forcing” contract, in which ﬁrms are rewarded for accepting a producer’s full line of products.
Movie distributors oﬀer video rental stores the choice of three contract types for distributing
the bulk of their titles: linear pricing (LP), revenue sharing (RS), and full-line forcing (FLF).
Under linear-pricing contracts, the store pays a ﬁxed, upfront cost per tape, usually between
$65 and $70. Under revenue-sharing contracts the upfront cost is much lower (around $8-$10
per tape) but the store also pays a fraction of the rental revenues (in the region of 55 percent)
to the distributor. Full-line forcing contracts provide better revenue-sharing terms than the
RS contracts (upfront costs of $3 per tape and revenue-sharing payments of 35 - 40 percent),
but require the store to buy minimum quantities of every title released by the distributor
during the period of the contract (usually 12 months).1 FLF contracts represent a mixed
1Distributors sell some additional titles on “sell-through pricing” contracts, in which all buyers, including
video rental stores, can purchase tapes for around $20-$25 each. There is no contract choice for these titles,
which usually include children’s movies or titles with “teenager” appeal.
1bundling arrangement because retailers can still acquire a distributor’s titles through LP or
RS contracts.
In a previous paper, Ho, Ho and Mortimer (2010), hereafter referred to as HHM, we
used the same data as in this paper to analyze the decisions of distributors and retailers
to oﬀer and adopt FLF contracts. HHM develops a detailed model of consumer demand
and estimates the value to retailers of holding inventory in this market. That paper then
uses the demand and supply-side models to investigate distributor decisions to oﬀer FLF
contracts, retailer decisions to take FLF contracts, and the proﬁtability of these choices.
Most large distributors oﬀer FLF contracts in our data. The analysis in HHM indicates that
distributors make proﬁt-maximizing choices when they decide whether or not to oﬀer FLF.
While that paper develops an approach for analyzing the contracts observed in the industry
and investigates the direct impacts of the FLF contracts for ﬁrms, it does not address the
implications for the retailer’s decision to stock competing titles not distributed through FLF
contracts. It also does not analyze the implied eﬀects of these choices on the overall variety
of products oﬀered to consumers and on social welfare.
In this paper we extend the previous ﬁndings by analyzing and quantifying the mag-
nitudes of the eﬀects of FLF adoption on the decision to stock competing titles, and the
implications of the FLF contracts for social welfare. We discuss three potential welfare ef-
fects of FLF contracts, a “market-coverage eﬀect” a “leverage eﬀect” and an “eﬃciency
eﬀect.”
An eﬃciency eﬀect occurs if there are titles for which the retailer stocks higher levels
of inventory in response to the lower upfront cost per tape on FLF compared to LP. Any
vertical contract that aligns the costs of upstream and downstream ﬁrms can result in an
eﬃciency eﬀect for the relevant products. In our setting, both RS and FLF contracts result
in lower upfront costs per tape compared to LP. However, RS mitigates the problem only
for low-value titles because of a selection eﬀect: stores tend to choose RS contracts for titles
where they expect to have low demand. When FLF contracts are introduced, the store is
required to take all of the distributor’s titles on revenue-sharing terms, implying that some
titles will be pulled out of LP contracts and into contracts with much lower costs per tape.
This reduces the ineﬃciency from the store’s low inventory choices under LP (conditional
on taking FLF), and is the source of the eﬃciency eﬀect.
A market-coverage eﬀect occurs if a retailer chooses a FLF contract when it would oth-
erwise not have taken all of the distributor’s titles, increasing the number of titles that are
available to consumers. Conversely, a leverage eﬀect occurs if the retailer compensates for
the requirement to take all of a distributor’s titles by dropping some titles produced by other
distributors. The market-coverage and leverage eﬀects both address the impact of FLF on
retailer decisions to stock titles, and together they determine the impact of FLF adoption
on the breadth of product variety potentially available to consumers. The overall eﬀect of
FLF on eﬃciency and welfare depends on the relative importance of these three eﬀects and
is an empirical question.
We ﬁrst investigate these eﬀects using regression analyses of our detailed dataset. Our
results are consistent with the existence of both an eﬃciency eﬀect and a market-coverage
eﬀect, but indicate that the leverage eﬀect may go in the opposite direction from that
predicted by theory. There are a few potential sources of this “positive” leverage eﬀect. For
example, the relatively low prices in the FLF contract may induce credit-constrained retailers
2to use the savings of the FLF terms to purchase more titles from competing distributors.
Alternatively, this result may reﬂect simultaneity bias. For example, our regressions control
for a rich set of ﬁxed eﬀects, but cannot control for demand shocks at the retailer-month
level that may prompt retailers to adopt FLF contracts and simultaneously increase their
holdings of other titles. A structural model is needed to address the selection issues and
to conduct a full welfare analysis. We utilize the detailed model of the industry that was
estimated in HHM and perform counterfactual analyses to investigate the three eﬀects of
bundling contracts. We ask how diﬀerent the market would look in terms of the number
of titles oﬀered to consumers, and the mix of distributors producing those titles. We also
predict inventories and prices under a counterfactual exercise in which FLF distributors
choose not to oﬀer FLF and, conversely, non-FLF distributors choose to oﬀer these bundling
contracts.
Our ﬁndings are consistent with the reduced-form results. We document the market-
coverage, leverage, and eﬃciency eﬀects. We ﬁnd that the leverage eﬀect is very small
(between -0.1 and +0.2 titles per distributor per year) and that, for four out of the six
large distributors analyzed, retailers slightly increase the number of titles taken from other
distributors when they adopt a FLF contract. The ﬁndings of a substantial, positive market
coverage eﬀect and a negligible leverage eﬀect imply a positive eﬀect of FLF contracts on the
variety of titles made available to consumers. We also ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of FLF contracts
on consumer surplus generally. In addition, we ﬁnd that retailers always beneﬁt from the
option to take FLF. However, in almost all cases these eﬀects are dominated by the impact of
the FLF contract on the focal distributor’s proﬁts. Our overall ﬁnding is that distributors’
choices regarding whether to oﬀer FLF contracts tend to be both proﬁt maximizing and
welfare enhancing.
We note that the non-FLF distributors in our data are major suppliers that have high
retailer take-up of their titles even without bundling contracts.2 It is not surprising that the
loss to these distributors from oﬀering the more generous FLF terms to retailers outweighs
the downstream beneﬁts to retailers and consumers. In contrast, the FLF distributors we
consider are somewhat less strong players that proﬁtably utilize FLF to persuade retailers
to take their titles. The very small leverage eﬀect means that the beneﬁts to consumers,
retailers and the focal distributor dominate any costs borne by competing distributors.
Understanding the eﬀects of FLF contracts speaks broadly to two literatures. First, the
literature on bundling/tying focuses on the beneﬁts that ﬁrms receive from bundling arrange-
ments through their ability to mimic price discrimination or apply leverage across products
or markets. Second, the literature on vertical arrangements focuses on their potential to
both soften competition (through foreclosure or by raising rivals’ costs) and induce eﬃcient
investments. All of these mechanisms may be present in FLF contracts, because they repre-
sent bundling in the context of a vertical arrangement. In the example we study, FLF terms
include a revenue-sharing component, making the vertical structure particularly salient.3
2See HHM for a more complete discussion.
3Burstein (1960) views full-line forcing as a means of achieving the eﬀects of vertical integration, and sev-
eral papers discuss the leverage eﬀect including, for example, Whinston (1990), Choi and Stefanadis (2001),
Carlton and Waldman (2002) and Nalebuﬀ (2004). Price discrimination is another potential explanation
that is examined in theoretical papers such as Stigler (1962), Adams and Yellen (1976), McAfee, McMillan
and Whinston (1989) and Salinger (1995). There is also a small but growing empirical literature studying
3The three eﬀects that we discuss (market-coverage, leverage, and eﬃciency) are impacted
by both the bundling and revenue-sharing components of FLF contracts. Bundling aﬀects
market coverage (the decision to take a title), while revenue-sharing terms may further aﬀect
the number of tapes taken (i.e., the size of a store’s inventory). Similarly, FLF contracts
aﬀect leverage, both through the decision to hold another distributor’s titles as well as the
inventory level of those titles. Finally, the eﬃciency eﬀect depends on both the bundling and
the revenue-sharing aspects of the contracts as well: bundling is required to induce ﬁrms to
forgo less eﬃcient LP contracts on high-value titles, and revenue-sharing terms are necessary
to reduce upfront costs so that inventory levels are closer to what an integrated ﬁrm would
choose.
Many aspects of the legal environment in the U.S. make a welfare study of FLF contracts
particularly interesting. Referring to U.S. law, Shy (1995) notes “courts have been more
receptive to vertical arrangements that [do] not involve price restraints.” This is due in part
to the potential for conﬂict between federal antitrust laws that govern price ﬁxing and state
laws that govern fair trade between ﬁrms. To the extent that ﬁrms can navigate their vertical
relationships via non-price strategies (such as tying/bundling, revenue-sharing, quantity re-
quirements, etc.), the potential for facing allegations of antitrust violations may be reduced.
As a result, such strategies are widely-adopted in vertical settings in many industries, mak-
ing our study an important ﬁrst step for understanding the use and implications of these
types of arrangements more generally.
This paper continues as follows. In Section 2 we outline the important institutional
features of the industry and discuss the empirical implications of the theoretical literature
on bundling; Section 3 describes the data. In Section 4 we provide regression analyses to
understand the selection eﬀect and the likely magnitudes of the welfare eﬀects. Sections 5
and 6 outline the model developed in HHM, which is applied in this paper to investigate
welfare eﬀects. Section 7 describes our welfare analyses and Section 8 concludes.
2 Full-Line Forcing in the Video Rental Market
This section summarizes some important institutional features of the market and discusses
the implications of bundling for eﬃciency in this industry.
2.1 The video rental market
The video rental industry has two primary tiers: distributors, who distribute movies, and
video rental stores, who acquire movies and oﬀer them for rental and sale to consumers.
Three diﬀerent contractual forms are used to distribute titles targeted to the rental market
bundling. Chu, Leslie and Sorensen (2007) studies bundling of theater tickets. Crawford (2008) examines
discriminatory incentives for bundling in cable TV, and Byzalov (2008) and Crawford and Yurukoglu (2008)
estimate the welfare eﬀects of bundling in the retail market for cable television. Relatedly, Asker (2005)
provides an empirical study of exclusive-dealing contracts in the context of beer distributors, and Marx and
Shaﬀer (2004) use reduced-form analyses to investigate the pro-competitive and anti-competitive eﬀects of
slotting allowances, which are paid by manufacturers to supermarkets in order to reserve shelf space for their
products. For further information, HHM provides a more detailed literature review.
4from distributors to rental stores. The ﬁrst is linear pricing (LP), in which a store purchases
a title from the distributor for a ﬁxed cost per tape, usually between $65 and $70.4
The second contractual form is revenue sharing (RS), in which a rental store leases a
title for a low upfront cost per tape, and shares the revenues generated by renting out a title
with the distributor. In the typical RS contract, the distributor charges an upfront cost of
around $8 per tape and receives about 55% of the rental revenue. The inventory taken by
the rental store under RS is generally constrained by both maximum and minimum quantity
requirements. RS and LP contracts are both implemented on a per-title basis.
The third form of contract is full-line forcing (FLF), in which the rental store agrees to
accept all titles released by the distributor during the period of the agreement (typically 12
months).5 The terms of the FLF contracts resemble generous RS contracts: the distributor
receives an upfront payment per tape of around $3 and a share of the revenues of around 30
percent, and the inventory of the retailer is restricted to be within a range, which varies by
distributor with the box oﬃce of the movie and the size of the store.
In addition to setting terms for each contractual form, the distributor can, in theory,
choose which contractual forms to oﬀer. In practice, RS contracts were not widely used
before the end of 1997, and FLF contracts were not introduced until February 1999. One
reason that these contracts were not used earlier is that both RS and FLF require extensive
computer monitoring of millions of transactions, and only about half of the stores in the
industry had the technology to adopt these contracts by 1998.
Finally, a few titles are oﬀered on “sell-through pricing” (STP) terms. These titles
include, for example, children’s movies and a few very popular titles. Under STP terms, the
distributor sells tapes for a wholesale price of around $15 each; these titles are purchased
both by video rental stores and also by end-users upon release. There are no alternative
contract choices for these titles. Finally, the sales market is important for distributors and
should be included in any model of their choices of contract types. However, sales provide
only a small proportion of total revenues of rental stores, whose choices are the focus of this
paper.
2.2 Empirical Implications of Theory on Bundling
We consider three potential welfare eﬀects of introducing FLF contracts. First, the contracts
aﬀect retailers’ inventory choices. The high cost of tapes under LP contracts causes stores
to choose low inventory levels for LP titles compared to the inventory choice of a vertically-
integrated ﬁrm. This ineﬃciency is reduced when titles shift to RS contracts because the
average upfront cost per tape falls and the store’s inventory level increases. However, when
choosing between RS and LP contracts, retailers have incentives to choose LP contracts when
4As discussed in our companion paper, rental stores may legally resell tapes purchased under LP contracts
(although in spite of this, we do observe a few volume discounts oﬀered under LP).
5Some exceptions apply: titles released by the distributor on sell-through pricing contracts (i.e., ﬁxed
price contracts, similar to LP, but with a low initial release price) are exempt, and several distributors allow
for limitations on the total number of titles that a retailer must accept within any given month. Usually, this
limit is three titles per month: if the distributor releases more than three titles in a month (a rare event),
the retailer is only obligated to accept three of them. Finally, FLF contracts also typically include opt-out
clauses for movies with ‘objectionable’ content.
5expected demand for the title is relatively high.6 Thus, oﬀering RS contracts in addition to
LP contracts may not mitigate the eﬃciency loss from low inventory choices for high-value
titles, for which the loss is relatively large. This is the source of the eﬃciency eﬀect of a FLF
contract: since the contract requires the store to take all of the relevant distributor’s titles
under terms that include a low upfront cost and a low average cost per tape, valuable titles
are pulled out of LP contracts, and this may signiﬁcantly reduce the low inventory problem.
The low inventory eﬀect of LP may not substantially aﬀect the prices charged to con-
sumers because there are two opposing eﬀects. First, the selection of high demand titles
under LP contracts (and possibly the higher average cost per tape) provides an incentive to
increase the average rental price compared to RS or FLF titles. However, once the inventory
has been purchased, the store has an incentive to price LP titles below the RS or FLF titles
that compete with them, in order to draw consumers to the titles for which they capture
100% of the rental revenues. These two oﬀsetting eﬀects may imply small diﬀerences in
rental prices between contract types.
There are two other potential welfare eﬀects of introducing FLF contracts. First, if the
store previously took only a subset of the distributor’s titles, the fact that it must now take
all of them implies a positive eﬀect on market coverage. This is probably welfare-improving
because it increases the size of consumers’ choice sets. Conversely, this eﬀect may prompt the
store to drop other distributors’ titles: this is the leverage eﬀect and is likely welfare-reducing,
because it reduces consumers’ choice sets and competition between distributors.
The relative magnitudes of these three eﬀects will depend on the mean and variance
of demand for the titles released by diﬀerent distributors, the extent of complementarities
between them, and the beneﬁt or cost to stores of holding inventory. The aggregate eﬀect of
FLF contracts on consumer choice sets and welfare is therefore an empirical question.
3 Data and Summary Statistics
We observe transaction data recorded at the store-title-month level from January 1, 1998 to
June 30, 2002. The data cover 6,393 video retail stores, 961 titles (201 in the A box-oﬃce
category, 188 B titles and 572 C titles) and 59 distributors. We observe store location at
the zipcode level, which allows us to combine the transaction data with phonebook listings
of competing video retail locations in each year, and data from the 2000 US Census on the
local demographic characteristics of each store.7
Summary statistics are provided in tables 1 to 5. Table 1 sets out average contract terms,
numbers of rentals, prices and inventories for each contract type. Averages are taken across
store-title pairs. The average estimated wholesale cost for LP contracts is $66.82, compared
to an average upfront cost of $8.47 for RS contracts, $3.62 for FLF contracts and a cost of
$15.17 for sell-through priced contracts. Retailers on average keep 46% of revenues under
RS contracts, and 59% of revenues under FLF contracts. The minimum number of tapes per
title is 10 on average for RS contracts and 11 for FLF contracts. On average, the maximum
number of tapes allowed per title is 23 for both contracts. Average month 1 rentals are
6The fact that retailers can choose between contracts presents an adverse selection problem for the
distributor. Mortimer (2008) formalizes this intuition under an assumption that demand is independent
across titles.
7For additional detail on the data, please see our companion paper.
6higher under RS contracts than FLF or LP contracts but the decay rate is also greatest for
these titles; by month 2 LP titles have higher demand and this remains true in months 3, 4
and 5.
Average inventory levels are highest for titles purchased under STP and RS contracts
and lowest for those under LP contracts. This is the source of the eﬃciency eﬀect described
above. Not surprisingly, retailers also extract the largest number of rentals per tape for titles
purchased under LP contracts. Average rental prices under RS contracts are very similar to
prices under LP contracts in the ﬁrst month of release, although they fall faster for RS titles
than for LP titles over time.8 This may indicate that the price-increasing eﬀect of a high
cost per tape under LP slightly outweighs the opposing eﬀect of the two-part tariﬀ under
RS. It also implies that the margin on which prices adjust may be the timing of removal of
the “new release” sticker, with concurrent price reduction or increase in the rental period
(and a resulting decrease in late fees collected).
Tables 2 and 3 summarize the number of titles released by distributors, and taken by
stores, under diﬀerent contract types. Roughly 90% of titles in our data are oﬀered under LP
contracts; 56% of these are also oﬀered under RS contracts.9 No FLF contracts are oﬀered
in the ﬁrst year of our data; a total of ten titles are oﬀered on FLF terms in year 2, eighteen
in year 3, and 38 in year 4. Table 3 further reports that stores on average adopt many more
titles under LP terms than under other contract types.
Table 4 provides information on the size distribution of stores choosing diﬀerent types
of contracts. Stores are categorized into ten sizes, called “tiers,” with tier 1 containing the
smallest stores and tier 10 the largest stores. We begin by calculating the percent of each
store’s titles that were taken under each contract type. We then break down this distribution
into quintiles and report, in the ﬁrst panel of the table, the average store size (tier) for each
quintile. The results demonstrate that stores that accept very few titles on LP contracts
(the lowest quintile) are the small stores - these stores take a relatively high proportion of
their titles on RS contracts. A similar pattern holds for STP titles. The stores that accept a
high proportion of their titles on LP contracts are on average larger stores. This is consistent
with the adverse selection eﬀect noted above: large stores tend to be located in high-demand
markets and therefore expect high demand for their titles. LP contracts are most proﬁtable
for these stores. The pattern for FLF contracts is more evenly spread, with mid-size stores
being more likely to accept a high proportion of their titles on FLF contracts.
The second panel of table 4 looks at these patterns in more detail. For each quintile and
contract type, we examine the percent of stores in that quintile/contract type that are in store
tiers 1-3 or store tiers 7-10. We normalize these percentages by the overall percent of stores
that are in those tier groups across all quintiles and contract types. Thus, the result of 1.59
for tier 1-3 under LP and Quintile 1 indicates that store tiers 1-3 (small stores) are relatively
over-represented in the ﬁrst quintile of LP contracts (a value greater than 1 indicates over-
representation, and a value less than 1 indicates under-representation). Overall, small stores
are over-represented in the ﬁrst, second, and third quintiles of LP contracts, the third, fourth
and ﬁfth quintiles of RS contracts and the ﬁrst and second quintiles of FLF contracts. The
8Average rental prices are calculated as total monthly revenue (including late fees) divided by total
monthly rentals.
9Approximately 10% of titles are oﬀered under STP terms only.
7reverse pattern holds for large stores: these are over-represented in the fourth and ﬁfth
quintiles of LP and FLF contracts and in the ﬁrst and second quintiles of RS contracts.
However, similar to small stores, large stores are also over-represented in the ﬁrst quintile of
FLF contracts.
Table 5 provides information on the contractual take-up of stores based on their chain
size. The construction of the table is analogous to table 4. Larger chains take more LP
contracts, and fewer RS contracts. Take-up of FLF contracts is highest for mid-sized chains
(note that both single stores and large chains are underrepresented in the highest quintile of
FLF take-up).
4 Reduced-Form Evidence
We now discuss preliminary evidence and patterns from the data. In particular, we ask
whether reduced-form analyses can provide any evidence on the importance of the eﬃciency,
market-coverage and leverage eﬀects of full-line forcing contracts. First, we summarize ev-
idence from previous papers that pertains to the eﬃciency eﬀect. Second, we provide new
analyses of the market-coverage and leverage eﬀects.
4.1 Previous Evidence on the Eﬃciency Eﬀect
Recall that the eﬃciency eﬀect fundamentally concerns the issue of double marginalization.
Speciﬁcally, when upstream ﬁrms sell inputs (i.e., tapes) to downstream retailers with a mark-
up, the level of inventory chosen by downstream retailers will be lower than the inventory level
that a vertically-integrated ﬁrm would have chosen. LP contracts have a much larger upfront
mark-up per tape, and titles distributed on LP contracts are subject to greater ineﬃciencies
than titles distributed on RS or FLF contracts. It is diﬃcult to measure this eﬀect because
of the importance of selection by retailers across contracts (i.e., retailers expecting to earn
lower revenues are more likely to take RS or FLF contracts), and this selection confounds our
ability to measure an eﬃciency eﬀect. Two previous papers (Mortimer (2008) and Ioannou,
Mortimer, and Mortimer (forthcoming)) examine this in detail. The relevant ﬁndings from
those papers indicate the following: smaller stores are more likely to participate in RS
contracts; stores accepting RS contracts purchase approximately three times more tapes
(compared to similar titles under LP contracts at the same store), but rentals increase by
only 30-40 percent; and the marginal return of a tape under diﬀerent contracts is close to
its net cost.10
4.2 Market Coverage
On average, stores take 53% of titles released by distributors that oﬀer FLF contracts at some
point, excluding FLF contracts themselves. This is consistent with a potentially large eﬀect
of FLF on market coverage. To investigate this issue, we estimate the following regression:
Titlesmdt = βFLFmdt + ηm + ηd + ηt + mdt. (1)
10In this prior research, the average net cost for LP titles reﬂects estimates of additional retailer discounts
not observed in the data, and is estimated to be on the order of $45 per tape.
8The dependent variable, Titlesmdt, denotes the number of titles taken at the store-
distributor-month level; FLFmdt is an indicator that store m has active FLF contracts for
distributor d in month t. To control for potential simultaneity resulting from time-invariant
store and distributor characteristics, we include store and distributor ﬁxed eﬀects, ηm and
ηd respectively. In addition, we include month ﬁxed eﬀects, ηt, to absorb any unobserved
eﬀects that are time-varying but invariant across stores and distributors (e.g., the catalog
of titles covered by a FLF contract in any given month). We include only store-distributor
pairs for which a FLF contract exists at some point in our panel, and only months when the
distributor oﬀers FLF contracts. We are therefore looking within-store and asking whether
taking a FLF contract from a particular distributor is correlated with title choices speciﬁc
to that distributor, controlling for average distributor and month eﬀects.
The ﬁrst column of table 6 provides the results from this regression. The coeﬃcient on
FLF activity in this regression is positive and signiﬁcant, with a value of 0.38, implying that
FLF stores carry 0.38 more titles per studio per month than they would have carried in the
absence of FLF contracts (or roughly 4.5 more titles per year for every studio with which
the retailer has a FLF contract). We also run similar regressions at the store-title level, in
which the dependent variables are the number of tapes per title and the total number of
transactions per title over its life.11 Thus, we estimate:
yjm = βFLFjm + ηm + ηj + jm. (2)
The dependent variable is either the number of tapes for title j at store m, or the number
of rentals for title j at store m. We replace distributor and month ﬁxed eﬀects with title ﬁxed
eﬀects.12 The second and third columns of table 6 provide the results of these regressions.
The coeﬃcient on FLF activity in the regression considering the number of tapes per title
is 2.77 (standard error 1.16).13 This implies a positive market expansion eﬀect in terms of
both the number of titles taken and the number of tapes per title. The equivalent coeﬃcient
in the transactions regression is also positive, but no longer signiﬁcant (coeﬃcient 12.71,
standard error 9.30). Taken together, the ﬁndings indicate that a retailer’s adoption of a
FLF contract with a distributor is associated with increased retailer product variety (i.e.,
more titles) and increased availability (i.e., more tapes for those titles) for titles sold by that
distributor.
4.3 Full-line Forcing and Competing Products
Our second reduced-form analysis investigates the leverage theory: that full-line forcing can
have anticompetitive eﬀects in the upstream market by reducing retailers’ orders from other
distributors. We might expect this eﬀect to generate a negative correlation between the
adoption of FLF contracts by a retailer and the orders (or rentals) of products from other,
non-bundling distributors, whether that is measured in terms of the number of titles or the
11As in Mortimer (2008), all titles are tracked for a minimum of six months.
12Month-level variation is suppressed. In the case of inventories, this is because inventories are only
ordered once for a given store-title pair. In the case of rentals, the estimation of month-level rental demand
requires a more careful model of decay rates and capacity constraints over time, which we address later in
the structural model.
13All standard errors account for correlation within store and title by clustering on both variables.
9number of tapes per title. However, most of the theories that generate such predictions
consider full bundling rather than mixed bundling. In our application (and consistent with
many information-goods markets), large stores can select into diﬀerent contractual forms in
particular months and for particular distributors or titles. This added complication may
mitigate some of the theoretical ﬁndings that are focused on full bundling.
We analyze the leverage eﬀect by examining the results of regressions that are very similar
to those run in the market-coverage analysis. The estimating equation is:
Titlesmdt = βFLFOthermdt + ηm + ηd + ηt + mdt (3)
where FLFOthermdt is an indicator that store m is using at least one active FLF contract
in month t with any other distributor, measured at the store-distributor-month level. As in
the previous section, we include store, distributor and month ﬁxed eﬀects. For each store,
we exclude from the regression distributors with which the store ever has a FLF contract,
and all months before FLF was oﬀered by any distributor. The results are shown in table
7. The coeﬃcient on the number of titles taken per store-distributor-month is positive and
signiﬁcant (coeﬃcient of 0.026, standard error 0.007). That is, the leverage eﬀect seems to
go in the opposite direction than a theorist would predict, albeit to a relatively small extent,
with the coeﬃcient implying one additional title every three years per non-FLF distributor.
As above, we also run similar regressions at the store-title level, where the dependent
variables are again the number of tapes per title and the number of transactions per title
(replacing month and distributor ﬁxed eﬀects with title ﬁxed eﬀects). The coeﬃcient on the
FLFOther variable in the speciﬁcation using the number of tapes per title as the left-hand
side variable is 0.31 (standard error 0.25); that on transactions per title regression is 9.36
(standard error 4.33). Thus, while the coeﬃcients also suggest a positive eﬀect of taking FLF
on other-distributor activity for these speciﬁcations, neither of the outcomes are signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero. The market-coverage and leverage eﬀects together suggest that adoption
of FLF contracts increase product variety and availability at retailers, thus expanding the
consumer choice set.
At least three possible factors may explain the result of a positive leverage eﬀect. The ﬁrst
is an income eﬀect that arises from the FLF contracts’ low prices relative to other contractual
forms. For titles that the retailer would have taken even without FLF, the improved terms
under FLF may permit an increase in the number of titles taken from other distributors.14
A second possible cause is that the adoption of FLF contracts, and the expansion of product
variety and availability through the market-coverage eﬀect creates increased traﬃc at the
retailer, which spills over to increase demand for non-FLF titles. The third possible cause is a
selection eﬀect. While we include store ﬁxed eﬀects to address bias due to retailers selecting
into FLF contracts, and distributor and month (and where possible, title) ﬁxed eﬀects to
absorb the average eﬀect of the numbers and qualities of titles released in particular months
or by particular distributors, it is not feasible to include interactions between these ﬁxed
eﬀects. The results may be consistent with stores taking FLF in periods when there is a
shock to demand (e.g. periods in which a distributor runs an especially eﬀective promotional
campaign, or there is entry or exit of a close competitor). The structural model, described
14This income eﬀect explanation requires some underlying ineﬃciency or assumption where retailers face
restrictions in obtaining outside ﬁnancing.
10below, is needed to separate this and similar demand eﬀects from the leverage eﬀect we wish
to identify.
5 A Model of Demand
We use the demand estimation results of HHM. To brieﬂy summarize the method, we deﬁne
a title’s competitors in each month as the titles that are released during the previous four
months (including the current month) and oﬀered by the retailer. We specify a nested-logit
model of demand, for which the demand equation is:
uijmt = δjmt + ζigmt + (1 − σ)εijmt (4)
where i indexes consumers, j titles, m stores, t months and g the genre/class group of the
title. The term ζigmt is an idiosyncratic preference term common to all titles in group g and
εijmt is an idiosyncratic preference term speciﬁc to consumer i and the product indexed by
jmt. Cardell (1997) gives conditions such that [ζigmt + (1 − σ)εijmt] has an extreme value
distribution with σ ∈ [0,1] parameterizing the correlation of the idiosyncratic preferences
within group (σ = 0 means no correlation; σ = 1 means perfect correlation). The term δjmt
is speciﬁed as:
δjmt = δj + γjzm + ηm + θt + βtxj + λtcjm − αpjmt + ξjmt (5)
where δj is a title ﬁxed eﬀect, ηm is a store ﬁxed eﬀect, θt is a month ﬁxed eﬀect, pjmt is
the average price per rental of the tape at store m in month t, and cjm is the inventory
of title j at store m. The last term ξjmt captures any unobservable quality of renting title
j in market m in month t (e.g. local promotions of a particular movie in a month). We
interact title dummies with store characteristics: these describe the demographics of the
store’s market. Demographic variables are the percent white, the percent single and the
percent with children. We therefore permit each store to predict the demand for a particular
title based on the demographics of local consumers.15 Month ﬁxed eﬀects are interacted with
title characteristics and with the store’s inventory level for the title. The latter accounts for
the diﬀerent average inventory levels associated with diﬀerent contract types. We instrument
for inventory using the average inventory of the same title across stores of the same tier. Our
instruments for within-group share are the log of the average number of movies of the same
type (same box-genre-store group) in the month, where the average is across other stores in
the same size tier that oﬀer the relevant title, and the average of ln(sjmt/gmt) for the same
title-month pair across same-tier stores. The assumptions under which these instruments
are valid are discussed in HHM.
15The HHM speciﬁcation could also have interacted store dummies with title characteristics. We choose
not to do this partly because our title characteristics are not very informative. In addition, the implied
eﬀect, that the “quality of a store” diﬀers across types of movies - would identify essentially the same eﬀect
as the γjzm term: that stores serving diﬀerent demographic groups expect diﬀerent movies to be popular.
115.1 Demand Results
HHM run the demand model separately for 15 diﬀerent geographic regions of the country
because the dataset is too large to run the model using all the data together. We reproduce
the results for the ﬁrst geographic region in table 8.16 The speciﬁcation also includes title and
store ﬁxed eﬀects and interactions between title ﬁxed eﬀects and store characteristics and
between month ﬁxed eﬀects and title characteristics (box oﬃce category, genre and rating
and interactions between these). Column 1 of the table reports results for the OLS regres-
sion. Column 2 adds instruments for within-group share and Column 3 also instruments for
inventory.
The R2 is approximately 0.80 in all three models. The fact that the model ﬁts the
data well is particularly useful since our supply side estimation will stay within-sample
in terms of titles and stores, allowing stores to deviate only in terms of contract choices.
We will therefore use all the estimated ﬁxed eﬀects in our inequalities and counterfactuals.
Additional discussion of the results may be found in the original HHM paper.
6 The Supply Side: Moment Inequalities
Having estimated a detailed demand model, the ﬁnal piece of information needed to analyze
stores’ choices of contract types is the value (positive or negative) of holding additional
tapes. This includes negative eﬀects such as rent, insurance and restocking costs and also
the potential value of selling used tapes and of drawing new customers into the store. We
use the inequalities estimator developed in HHM. The estimator assumes the existence of a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium where each retailer’s proﬁt from its observed portfolio of titles
and choice of inventory per title is greater than its proﬁt from any of its alternative choices.
A series of inequality constraints are derived from this assumption and used for estimation.
The value of additional inventory is permitted to diﬀer between titles taken on LP and RS
contracts and also between titles in diﬀerent box oﬃce groups and between diﬀerent types
of retailers. The results are reproduced in table 9.
Most of the estimated coeﬃcients are negative, implying a positive value of holding
inventory for almost all retailers and titles. Most retailers (all but the stand-alone outlets)
have a much higher value per tape for LP titles than for RS titles. HHM notes two hypotheses
that may explain this ﬁnding. First chains may make more money from LP than from RS,
for example because of volume discounts. Second they may have deep relationships with LP
wholesalers that make them inclined to take more titles on LP even though this does not
directly increase their bottom line proﬁts. The paper distinguishes between these hypotheses
by using the model (including both demand and supply side estimates) to predict retailers’
decisions regarding FLF take-up when diﬀerent proportions of the estimated incremental
value of LP tapes is assumed to aﬀect bottom line proﬁts. The proportion that best ﬁts
the model’s prediction to observed data on FLF take-up is 44%. We assume that this is the
correct proportion and use it in the welfare analyses that follow.
16This region contains zip codes from 20000 to 24999. It includes areas in the mid-Atlantic such as
Washington DC and parts of Virginia.
127 Impact on Consumer Choice Sets and Welfare
We now use the model to estimate the eﬀect of FLF contracts on consumer choice sets (i.e.,
the variety of products carried by retailers) and welfare. Our methodology expands upon
that used in HHM to investigate the decisions of distributors to oﬀer, and retailers to adopt,
FLF contracts. We focus on six large distributors during a 12-month period of our panel.
Two of the six oﬀer FLF terms. For each focal distributor we predict retailers’ choices when
FLF is oﬀered in the relevant year and when it is not, in each case allowing each retailer to
optimize over the titles oﬀered by other distributors as well as by the focal distributor. We
make the simplifying assumption that retailers’ orders only take into account titles that are
released in the previous four months or in the current month (i.e., the time period during
which the bulk of all rentals occur for a title). Inventory and rental price are assumed to be
determined by contract type (the average in the data for the store-box-contract type-month).
HHM reports predicted retailer take-up of the focal distributor’s titles and retailer and
distributor proﬁts when FLF contracts are oﬀered and when they are not. Tables 10 through
12 extend the results of the HHM analysis to identify the leverage eﬀect, as well as the
implications of the FLF contracts on social welfare that result from the leverage, eﬃciency,
and market-coverage eﬀects. Table 10 reports results from the structural model for the
predicted changes in retailers’ choices of titles that result from the use of a FLF contract.
The eﬀect of the FLF contracts on the titles of the focal distributor describe the market-
coverage eﬀect, and were originally provided in HHM. The eﬀect of the FLF contracts on the
titles of competing distributors identiﬁes the leverage eﬀect, which is estimated by predicting
retailers’ choices of titles for those distributors. Table 11 reports the average predicted change
in the number of tapes per title taken by retailers from the focal distributor when they adopt
FLF, helping to identify the eﬃciency eﬀect. Finally, table 12 provides a welfare analysis of
the eﬀect of the FLF contracts. The eﬀect of the contracts on the proﬁts of distributors and
retailers was previously reported in HHM; table 12 adds an analysis of the impact of FLF
on consumer surplus, and the net eﬀect for social welfare.
Each table has seven panels that relate to the six distributors considered in the simula-
tions. The ﬁrst FLF distributor has two panels relating to the 294 (1574) retailers that take
(do not take) the FLF contract in reality. The second FLF distributor has just one panel
relating to 2093 retailers, all of which took the FLF contract.17 Four additional panels relate
to each of the non-FLF distributors.
The results are consistent with the reduced-form analyses. Table 10 documents the
market-coverage eﬀect: for every focal distributor the mean number of titles predicted to be
dropped per retailer falls when FLF is oﬀered (for example from 3.4 to 1.5 for the second FLF
distributor and from 2.8 to 0.9 for the third non-FLF distributor). In contrast the leverage
eﬀect is very small. In four out of six cases the introduction of FLF by the focal distributor
coincides with a slight increase in the average take-up of other distributors’ titles.18 The title
17Only 35 retailers choose not to take FLF from this distributor, a sample too small to analyze. We
exclude one additional retailer that was included in the sample in HHM because its consumer surplus eﬀects
are in the tail of the distribution and we wish to prevent our estimates being aﬀected by outliers. This has
no eﬀect on the results reported in table 10 and changes each of the proﬁt numbers reported in table 12 by
less than $11.
18For the ﬁrst non-FLF distributor the average number of other-distributor titles dropped falls from 5.44
13ﬁxed eﬀects and their interactions with retailer demographic characteristics in the demand
model control for the positive demand shocks that were the third possible cause of the
leverage results in the regression analyses. We conclude that the results are likely to be
due to retailers using the savings from improved terms to increase their overall portfolios or
responding to increased demand caused by the market-coverage eﬀect. The results for the
market-coverage and leverage eﬀects indicate that adoption of FLF contracts substantially
increases the choice set available to consumers, by increasing the number of titles taken from
the FLF distributor, while having little or no change in the number of titles taken from other
distributors.
Table 11 documents the eﬃciency eﬀect. We consider only retailers that are predicted to
adopt FLF from the focal distributor and only titles released by the focal distributor that
the retailer is predicted to take when FLF is not available.19 We report the average predicted
diﬀerence between the number of tapes taken per title by the retailer when it adopts FLF
and the number taken when FLF is not available, where the average is taken across titles
and then across retailers. We then report the averages separately for titles taken on LP
contracts and those taken on RS contracts in the no-FLF scenario. As expected, we observe
an increase in inventory overall, with the average increase ranging from 1.08 tapes per title
for the third non-FLF distributor to 4.16 tapes per title for the second non-FLF distributor.
The increase is substantially larger for titles that are taken on LP when FLF is not available
than for those taken on RS.20 This is the source of the eﬃciency eﬀect.
Finally table 12 reports welfare eﬀects. Columns 1-3 report retailer and distributor
proﬁts. Mean retailer proﬁts always increase when they are given the additional option of
choosing FLF contracts. Each focal distributor’s observed choice of whether to oﬀer FLF is
proﬁt-maximizing: FLF distributors have higher proﬁts when FLF is made available while
non-FLF distributors’ proﬁts are higher when it is not.21 The very small leverage eﬀect
implies that other distributors’ proﬁts diﬀer very little across the two scenarios. Column 4
indicates that the average consumer surplus per store is always slightly higher when FLF is
oﬀered than when it is not. The sign of this eﬀect comes from the larger set of titles and
inventory made available to consumers under FLF. Its small magnitude reﬂects the fact that
many of the most popular titles were already being oﬀered, implying that the beneﬁts of
increasing variety are not well captured by mean results.
The overall welfare estimates indicate that distributors’ observed choices of whether to
oﬀer FLF contracts are almost always welfare-maximizing as well as proﬁt-maximizing. For
to 5.35 when FLF is adopted. Both are reported as 5.4 in the table to ensure format consistency across
panels.
19We reduce the sample further by including only retailers that are predicted to take titles on both LP and
RS contracts when FLF is not available. We exclude retailers that take only LP contracts in this scenario
because the selection eﬀect already discussed implies that their inventory per title under LP is higher than
that for other stores. Including them would make it diﬃcult to compare the numbers for titles taken on LP
to those that are taken on RS contracts in the no-FLF scenario.
20As shown in Table 1, the average inventory taken per title under FLF is in fact slightly lower than that
under RS when the average is across all store-title pairs. The diﬀerent results reported here are likely to be
due to the diﬀerent sample of retailers and titles considered.
21FLF distributor 1 would lose money on average from FLF contracts with retailers that in reality do not
take a FLF contract. These retailers diﬀer in several observable dimensions from retailers that take FLF
from the distributor.
14both FLF distributors, the loss to other distributors from the introduction of FLF is out-
weighed by the gains to the focal distributor, to retailers and to consumers. For three out
of four non-FLF distributors, the loss to the focal distributor from oﬀering FLF outweighs
the gains to all other agents. Only non-FLF distributor 4 makes a choice that reduces total
welfare. In that case the large beneﬁt to retailers and consumers from FLF would have
outweighed the loss to the focal distributor.
8 Conclusion
The results from the detailed model are in line with our reduced-form estimates. We doc-
ument the market-coverage and eﬃciency eﬀects but ﬁnd that the leverage eﬀect is very
small in magnitude and often implies an increase in the take-up of other-distributor titles
when FLF is adopted. The leverage eﬀect ﬁnding is interesting because the distributors we
consider are among the largest in the data in terms of both numbers of titles released and
revenues. These major suppliers might be expected to have some inﬂuence over retailers’
portfolio choices outside their own product oﬀerings. The ﬁnding that this is not the case
may be explained by the relatively generous terms of FLF contracts in our data coupled with
the concentration of FLF take-up among larger retailers, whose choice of other-studio titles
is less likely to be aﬀected by an increase in inventory taken from one distributor.
Overall, the adoption of FLF contracts is associated with increased product variety and
availability for consumers, and increased proﬁts for retailers. However, the decision to oﬀer
FLF contracts rests with the focal studio. In our previous work, we found that the distrib-
utors choosing not to oﬀer FLF had high take-up rates from retailers, even in the absence
of these bundling contracts. It is perhaps not surprising then, that the cost of oﬀering more
generous terms to retailers outweighs the potential beneﬁt for these distributors. Conversely,
the FLF distributors we analyze have lower take-up rates in general; for these distributors,
we predict that the beneﬁts of oﬀering bundling contracts outweigh the costs. This together
with the positive consumer surplus and retailer proﬁt eﬀects imply welfare gains from FLF.
The methodology developed in this paper is generally applicable to other information-
goods industries where there is a constant cycle of new content introduction and relatively
rapid peaks and decay in demand. Furthermore, vertical and downstream contractual and
content bundling arrangements are constantly evolving in these industries as content is digi-
tized and new distribution channels are pursued. Our detailed consumer demand information
combined with detailed vertical contractual information is unusual for empirical analyses of
the impact of product bundling. These detailed data allow for unique insights on the im-
pacts of vertical arrangements and bundling, and provide a basis for considering the impact
of similar contractual arrangements in information-goods industries generally.
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17Table 1: Summary Statistics
Linear Revenue Full-Line Sell-Through
Contract Pricing Sharing Forcing Pricing
Avg. Upfront Cost 66.82 8.47 3.62 15.17
(5.60) (1.08) (1.20) (1.63)
Avg. Retailer’s Share of Revenue 100% 45.99% 59.02% 100%
(-) (2.99%) (1.99%) (-)
Avg. Minimum quantity - 10.32 10.87 -
(-) (11.55) (10.53) (-)
Avg. Maximum quantity - 23.49 22.61 -
(-) (22.48) (21.38) (-)
Avg No. of Rentals
Month 1: 52.11 62.58 52.16 91.28
(81.85) (86.88) (88.72) (120.49)
Month 2: 67.36 66.21 61.87 85.32
(92.91) (91.18) (82.27) (101.92)
Month 3: 40.22 33.24 33.12 41.31
(52.88) (44.99) (44.23) (47.93)
Month 4: 25.90 21.22 20.93 23.00
(32.42) (27.54) (26.94) (25.80)
Month 5+: 69.89 56.79 51.45 74.56
(101.98) (83.37) (74.42) (134.51)
Avg Rental Price
Month 1: 2.65 2.68 2.68 2.69
(0.57) (0.49) (0.60) (0.53)
Month 2: 2.83 2.78 2.88 2.87
(0.56) (0.50) (0.56) (0.59)
Month 3: 2.83 2.78 2.87 2.94
(0.61) (0.55) (0.64) (0.71)
Month 4: 2.83 2.78 2.86 2.96
(0.67) (0.60) (0.68) (0.83)
Month 5+: 2.79 2.68 2.86 2.93
(0.72) (0.67) (0.76) (0.89)
Avg Rentals per Tape
Month 1: 5.58 4.19 4.14 5.26
(4.44) (2.72) (3.14) (4.85)
Month 2: 7.59 4.71 5.54 5.19
(4.93) (3.11) (3.84) (3.75)
Month 3: 5.06 2.51 3.46 2.71
(3.83) (1.86) (2.91) (2.17)
Month 4: 3.59 1.67 2.48 1.65
(2.98) (1.32) (2.43) (1.69)
Month 5+: 13.59 5.00 7.42 6.72
(14.47) (4.93) (9.56) (8.99)
Avg Inventory 9.09 14.20 12.74 18.18
(14.25) (16.86) (17.27) (21.60)
Notes: Averages are across store-title pairs. Standard deviations in parentheses.Table 2: Titles Released by Distributors
Linear Revenue Full-Line Sell-Through
Contract Pricing Sharing Forcing Pricing
Total No. of Titles Released
by Distributors
Year 1: 219 115 0 27
A Titles: 30 12 0 15
B Titles: 36 17 0 6
C Titles: 153 86 0 6
Year 2: 204 125 10 24
A Titles: 32 23 1 14
B Titles: 42 29 2 6
C Titles: 130 73 7 4
Year 3: 231 132 18 21
A Titles: 43 29 4 15
B Titles: 44 29 3 1
C Titles: 144 74 11 5
Year 4: 209 113 38 26
A Titles: 36 20 9 16
B Titles: 50 19 5 3
C Titles: 123 74 24 7
Notes: Total number of titles released by distributors and oﬀered under each contract type. Titles
may be counted in more than one column. All Revenue-Sharing and Full-Line Forcing titles are also
oﬀered under Linear-Pricing contracts. No Sell-Through Pricing titles are oﬀered under alternate
contracts.
19Table 3: Titles Taken by Stores
Linear Revenue Full-Line Sell-Through
Contract Pricing Sharing Forcing Pricing
Number of Stores
6,358 6,150 5,111 6,171
Avg No. of Titles Taken by Stores
Year 1: 32.54 7.92 - 6.72
(23.80) (11.21) - (4.56)
A Titles: 19.57 4.94 - 11.83
(7.52) (3.56) - (4.12)
B Titles: 23.61 5.29 - 4.27
(9.33) (5.39) - (1.64)
C Titles: 54.51 13.56 - 3.99
(28.74) (16.97) - (1.69)
Year 2: 23.15 6.84 1.39 5.05
(18.97) (7.74) (1.53) (4.11)
A Titles: 14.29 7.04 0.61 8.87
(8.69) (5.99) (0.49) (4.34)
B Titles: 19.94 6.94 1.22 3.85
(11.68) (7.68) (0.85) (2.37)
C Titles: 35.63 6.54 2.36 2.32
(25.23) (9.25) (2.14) (1.55)
Year 3: 32.69 6.30 2.09 4.90
(23.50) (8.37) (2.07) (5.57)
A Titles: 23.35 7.32 1.57 11.23
(12.18) (7.31) (0.98) (5.21)
B Titles: 26.26 5.35 0.92 0.78
(13.20) (7.51) (0.66) (0.41)
C Titles: 48.79 6.20 3.80 2.53
(30.95) (9.95) (2.64) (1.43)
Year 4: 28.26 4.67 3.36 5.79
(15.20) (6.14) (3.44) (5.16)
A Titles: 19.64 5.66 3.33 11.74
(8.65) (5.30) (2.07) (4.78)
B Titles: 32.59 3.69 1.05 2.41
(12.55) (5.37) (0.98) (1.06)
C Titles: 32.60 4.64 5.72 3.18
(18.72) (7.37) (4.40) (1.48)
Notes: Average number of titles of each contract type taken by all active stores in each year.
Standard deviations in parentheses. 20Table 4: Contracts Taken by Store Size
Linear Revenue Full-Line Sell-Through
Contract Pricing Sharing Forcing Pricing
Ave store tier
Quintile 1 2.68 5.04 3.77 5.47
Quintile 2 2.95 5.05 2.78 4.65
Quintile 3 3.51 3.63 4.26 3.98
Quintile 4 4.79 2.97 4.25 3.03
Quintile 5 5.46 2.70 4.31 2.27
Quintile % of quintile
1 Tier 1-3 1.59 0.43 1.13 0.54
Tier 7-10 0.53 1.71 1.40 2.99
2 Tier 1-3 1.41 0.41 1.48 0.56
Tier 7-10 0.31 1.41 0.30 1.20
3 Tier 1-3 1.15 1.19 0.71 0.84
Tier 7-10 0.65 1.00 0.80 0.54
4 Tier 1-3 0.47 1.40 0.84 1.34
Tier 7-10 1.11 0.34 1.16 0.15
5 Tier 1-3 0.37 1.57 0.85 1.72
Tier 7-10 2.39 0.53 1.30 0.12
Notes: Panel 1 breaks the percent of each store’s titles adopted under a particular type of contract
into quintiles and reports the average store tier in each quintile. Tiers are ranked from 1 to 10
where 10 is largest. Panel 2 reports the percent of stores in each quintile that are in store tiers 1-3
and 7-10 respectively. These percentages are normalized by the percent of all stores that are in the
relevant set of tiers. Numbers over 1 indicate that the store type is over-represented in the relevant
quintile.
21Table 5: Contracts Taken by Chain Size
Linear Revenue Full-Line Sell-Through
Contract Pricing Sharing Forcing Pricing
Ave chain size
Quintile 1 1.69 2.67 1.68 2.33
Quintile 2 2.01 2.46 2.10 2.32
Quintile 3 2.11 2.16 2.55 2.44
Quintile 4 2.53 1.95 2.52 2.05
Quintile 5 2.49 1.66 2.20 1.71
Quintile % of quintile
1 Single stores 1.96 0.25 1.93 0.58
Large chains 0.47 3.32 0.70 2.09
2 Single stores 1.29 0.36 1.12 0.60
Large chains 1.36 2.47 1.52 2.09
3 Single stores 0.93 0.88 0.24 0.59
Large chains 1.46 1.63 2.33 2.61
4 Single stores 0.44 1.34 0.18 1.26
Large chains 2.95 1.11 2.15 1.51
5 Single stores 0.39 2.00 0.05 1.99
Large chains 2.72 0.44 0.80 0.66
Notes: Panel 1 breaks the percent of each store’s titles adopted under a particular type of contract
into quintiles and reports the average store tier in each quintile. We grouped chains into three
groups with value 1 for single-store chains, 2 for chains with 2-44 stores, and 3 for chains with 112 -
1652 stores. Panel 2 reports the percent of stores in each quintile that are in chain group 1 (single-
store chains) and chain group 3 (112-1652 stores) respectively. These percentages are normalized
by the percent of all stores that are in the relevant set of chains. Numbers over 1 indicate that the
store type is over-represented in the relevant quintile.
22Table 6: Regression Analysis: market-coverage Effect
Dependent variable: Titles Tapes per title Rentals per title
Did FLF? 0.38 2.77 12.71
(0.13) (1.16) (9.30)
Month FE? Y Y Y
Store FE? Y Y Y
Distributor FE? Y N N
Title FE? N Y Y
R2 0.38 0.52 0.62
Observations 97,444 136,057 136,057
Notes: Regression analyses to investigate the market coverage eﬀect. The regression in Column 1
is at the store-distributor-month level. The dependent variable is the number of titles taken by the
store from the relevant distributor-month. The regressions in Columns 2 and 3 are at the store-title
level. The dependent variables are the number of tapes per title and the number of rentals per title
respectively. In all three regressions the ﬁrst explanatory variable is an indicator for active FLF
contracts for the relevant store-distributor-month triple. Only store-title pairs for which FLF was
oﬀered by the distributor and FLF was taken at some point by the store are included. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses.
23Table 7: Regression Analysis: Leverage Effect
Dependent variable: Titles Tapes per title Rentals per title
Ever FLF? 0.026 0.31 9.36
(0.007) (0.25) (4.33)
Month FE? Y Y Y
Store FE? Y Y Y
Distributor FE? Y N N
Title FE? N Y Y
R2 0.44 0.58 0.66
Observations 6,053,143 1,146,598 1,146,598
Notes: Regression analyses to investigate the leverage eﬀect. The regression in Column 1 is at the
store-distributor-month level. The dependent variable is the number of titles taken by the store
from the relevant distributor-month. The regressions in Columns 2 and 3 are at the store-title
level. The dependent variables are the number of tapes per title and the number of rentals per title
respectively. In all three regressions the ﬁrst explanatory variable is an indicator for active FLF
contracts in that month with some other distributor. Only store-month pairs for which FLF was
taken at some point by the store for any distributor are included. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses.
24Table 8: Demand Results and Elasticity Estimates
OLS IV 1 IV 2
Coef (S.E.) Coef (S.E.) Coef (S.E.)
Price -0.027 (0.002) -0.026 (0.003) -0.024 (0.003)
Month 2 0.132 (0.023) 0.155 (0.024) 0.139 (0.025)
Month 3 -0.136 (0.022) -0.191 (0.025) -0.206 (0.025)
Month 4 -0.399 (0.023) -0.505 (0.025) -0.512 (0.026)
Month 5+ 0.190 (0.024) 0.276 (0.027) 0.283 (0.027)
Inventory 0.019 (0.0003) 0.021 (0.0004) 0.016 (0.0005)
Inv*Month 2 -0.003 (0.0004) -0.004 (0.0005) -0.003 (0.0005)
Inv*Month 3 -0.008 (0.0004) -0.009 (0.0005) -0.008 (0.0005)
Inv*Month 4 -0.012 (0.0004) -0.013 (0.0005) -0.013 (0.0005)
Inv*Month 5 -0.011 (0.0004) -0.013 (0.0005) -0.014 (0.0005)
σ 0.632 (0.0018) 0.498 (0.0030) 0.501 (0.0031)
N 407,006 407,006 407,006
R2 0.82 0.76 0.76
Month 1 Month 2 Month 3 Month 4 Month 5
All Box Oﬃce categories:
Price elasticity -0.127 -0.132 -0.139 -0.143 -0.129
Inventory elasticity 0.269 0.224 0.151 0.090 0.058
Box Oﬃce Category A:
Price elasticity -0.125 -0.132 -0.142 -0.148 -0.138
Inventory elasticity 0.521 0.437 0.294 0.176 0.123
Box Oﬃce Category B:
Price elasticity -0.125 -0.127 -0.136 -0.140 -0.128
Inventory elasticity 0.234 0.188 0.128 0.078 0.052
Box Oﬃce Category C:
Price elasticity -0.129 -0.135 -0.139 -0.141 -0.123
Inventory elasticity 0.106 0.089 0.059 0.035 0.022
Notes: In the top panel, IV1 results instrument for the within-group share only; IV2 instruments for
within-group share and inventory (region 1). All speciﬁcations include title and store ﬁxed eﬀects,
interactions between title ﬁxed eﬀects and store characteristics (the percent with kids, the percent
single and the percent white) and interactions between month ﬁxed eﬀects and title characteristics
(box oﬃce category, genre, rating and interactions of these variables). In the bottom panel, demand
elasticities with respect to price and inventory are calculated for every store-title-month observation
and then averages are taken within each zipcode region - month, and then across regions. 25Table 9: Inequalities Analysis Results
Coeﬃcient 95% CI
Per Tape:
Constant -2.66** [-3.02, -2.14]
Box B title 3.14** [1.18, 5.46]
Box C title -7.99** [-8.72, -7.51]
Linear Pricing 12.14** [7.31, 17.78]
LP*Box B title 2.65 [-0.19, 4.99]
LP*Box C title 0.04 [-0.67, 0.93]
LP*Medium Chain Size -46.47** [-52.90, -41.63]
LP*Large Chain Size -51.38** [-57.31, -47.07]
LP*Tiers 4-6 1.57 [-0.08, 4.08]
LP*Tiers 7-10 -6.41** [-8.17, -3.89]
Notes: In Table 9, coeﬃcients represent predicted costs to the store per tape. “Box B title” and
“Box C title” are indicators for titles in Box Oﬃce categories B and C: those with theatrical box
oﬃce revenues $15-40 million and under $15 million respectively. “Medium Chain Size” and “Large
Chain Size” are stores in chains containing 2-44 stores and 112-1652 stores respectively. Store tiers
rank stores by size, where 1 is smallest and 10 is largest. “Linear Pricing” is an indicator for
store-title pairs where the title is taken on a LP contract. **: signiﬁcant at p=0.05; *: signiﬁcant
at p=0.10.
26Table 10: Average Predicted Retailer Choices of Titles by Contract Type
Number Focal distributor titles Other distributor titles
of stores None/LP/RS/FLF None/LP/RS/FLF
I. FLF studio 1
i. FLF stores
model (no FLF) 294 4.1 / 11.1 / 2.8 / 0 5.5 / 9.2 / 3.7 / 0
model (with FLF) 2.3 / 6.4 / 1.4 / 7.9 5.6 / 9.1 / 3.8 / 0
ii. non-FLF stores
model (no FLF) 1574 4.7 / 10.1 / 3.2 / 0 1.3 / 2.1 / 0.2 / 0
model (with FLF) 4.0 / 8.7 / 2.4 / 3.0 1.2 / 2.2 / 0.2 / 0
II. FLF studio 2
i. FLF stores
model (no FLF) 2093 3.4 / 2.6 / 0.0 / 0 5.7 / 7.8 / 3.6 / 0
model (with FLF) 1.5 / 0.6 / 0.0 / 3.9 5.9 / 7.6 / 3.6 / 0
III. Non-FLF studio 1
model (no FLF) 2316 5.4 / 13.8 / 1.8 / 0 5.4 / 9.0 / 0.1 / 0
model (with FLF) 3.0 / 6.6 / 0.7 / 10.7 5.4 / 9.1 / 0.1 / 0
IV. Non-FLF studio 2
model (no FLF) 2316 3.9 / 5.6 / 0.5 / 0 4.3 / 7.9 / 0.3 / 0
model (with FLF) 2.8 / 3.4 / 0.4 / 3.4 4.2 / 8.0 / 0.3 / 0
V. Non-FLF studio 3
model (no FLF) 2316 2.8 / 6.8 / 9.4 / 0 2.3 / 4.5 / 0.2 / 0
model (with FLF) 0.9 / 1.6 / 1.7 / 14.7 2.2 / 4.6 / 0.2 / 0
VI. Non-FLF studio 4
model (no FLF) 2316 12.1 / 8.6 / 0.3 / 0 2.2 / 2.7 / 0.1 / 0
model (with FLF) 0.3 / 1.1 / 0.0 / 19.6 2.1 / 2.8 / 0.1 / 0
Notes: Predictions of the counterfactual analysis for average portfolio choices of retailers, by dis-
tributor. FLF distributors 1 and 2 oﬀer FLF terms in the data; Non-FLF distributors 1-4 do not.
“Non-FLF stores” do not take FLF terms from a FLF studio. “Model (no FLF)” is the model’s
prediction if FLF is not an option; “Model (with FLF)” is the model’s prediction if FLF is an
option for the retailer.
27Table 11: Average Predicted Change in Retailer Inventory Choices When
Full-Line Forcing is Adopted
Number Average change in tapes per title
of stores Overall LP to FLF RS to FLF
I. FLF studio 1
i. FLF stores 37 1.45 2.40 0.12
ii. non-FLF stores 293 3.26 4.64 0.91
II. Non-FLF studio 1 1178 2.30 2.76 0.50
III. Non-FLF studio 2 752 4.16 4.48 0.88
IV. Non-FLF studio 3 1736 1.08 2.61 0.43
V. Non-FLF studio 4 2248 3.00 3.20 0.76
Notes: Predictions of the counterfactual analysis for average changes in inventory choices of retailers
when titles are taken on FLF, by distributor. Only retailers that the model predicts will take FLF
from the focal distributor if it is available, and that take both LP and RS contracts from the focal
distributor when FLF is not oﬀered, are included. We consider all titles released by the focal
distributor that are taken by the retailer when FLF is not oﬀered. ”Overall” column reports the
cross-retailer, cross-title average diﬀerence between the inventory per title taken under FLF and
that taken when FLF is not oﬀered for titles predicted to be taken when FLF is not available.
”LP to FLF” reports the analogous results for titles predicted to be taken on LP in the no-FLF
scenario. ”RS to FLF” reports the results for titles taken on RS when FLF is not available. FLF
distributor 1 oﬀers FLF terms in the data; Non-FLF distributors 1-4 do not. FLF distributor 2 is
excluded because no retailers that are predicted to take FLF when it is oﬀered also take titles on
both LP and RS.
28Table 12: Average Predicted Retailer and Distributor Profits, Consumer
Surplus and Total Welfare
Mean store Focal distributor Other distributor Mean CS Welfare
proﬁts proﬁts / store proﬁts / store per store per store
I. FLF studio 1
i. FLF stores
No FLF option $48,151 $5,888 $76,886 $6,245 $137,170
With FLF option $48,619 $5,910 $76,761 $6,251 $137,541
ii. non-FLF stores
No FLF option $52,069 $5,706 $73,356 $4,856 $135,987
With FLF option $52,262 $5,354 $73,372 $4,857 $135,845
II. FLF studio 2
i. FLF stores
No FLF option $58,988 $749 $98,506 $6,194 $164,437
With FLF option $59,232 $945 $98,419 $6,199 $164,794
III. Non-FLF studio 1
No FLF option $57,251 $7,981 $75,547 $4,498 $145,278
With FLF option $58,101 $5,996 $75,556 $4,551 $144,205
IV. Non-FLF studio 2
No FLF option $57,758 $6,472 $78,146 $4,533 $146,908
With FLF option $58,120 $5,500 $78,203 $4,534 $146,356
V. Non-FLF studio 3
No FLF option $56,833 $5,033 $82,333 $4,659 $148,857
With FLF option $57,638 $3,151 $82,399 $4,667 $147,854
VI. Non-FLF studio 4
No FLF option $57,402 $4,400 $79,334 $4,623 $145,759
With FLF option $61,194 $954 $79,330 $4,700 $146,178
Notes: Predictions of simulations using model set out in Ho, Ho and Mortimer (2010). Column 1
reports mean store proﬁts, column 2 reports average focal distributor proﬁts per retailer, column
3 reports total non-focal distributor proﬁts per retailer (summed over all non-focal distributors),
column 4 reports average consumer surplus per retailer and column 5 reports average total welfare
per retailer. For each focal distributor the ﬁrst row reports the model’s predictions when the option
of taking FLF is not available. The second row reports predictions when FLF is available.
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